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Abstract:
The publication of increasing amounts of anonymised open source data has resulted
in a worryingly rising number of successful re-identification attacks. This has a 
number of privacy and security implications both on an individual and corporate 
level. 
This paper uses a Systematic Literature Review to investigate the depth and extent 
of this problem as reported in peer reviewed literature. Using a detailed protocol 
,seven research portals were explored, 10,873 database entries were searched, 
from which a subset of 220 papers were selected for further review. From this total, 
55 papers were selected as being within scope and to be included in the final review.
The main review findings are that 72.7% of all successful re-identification attacks 
have taken place since 2009. Most attacks use multiple datasets. The majority of 
them have taken place on global datasets such as social networking data, and have 
been conducted by US based researchers. Furthermore, the number of datasets can
be used as an attribute.
Because privacy breaches have security, policy and legal implications (e.g. data 
protection, Safe Harbor etc.), the work highlights the need for new and improved 
anonymisation techniques or indeed, a fresh approach to open source publishing. 
Keywords:
Re-identification, anonymisation, anonymization, systematic literature review
Re-identification attacks: a Systematic Literature Review
Highlights:
 A Systematic Literature Review investigating the prevalence of re-
identification attacks on publically available datasets.
 Attacks have been categorised into five attack categories, with the 
majority of successful attacks having been conducted utilising multiple 
datasets.
 Further findings are that most research in this area has been 
conducted on Global datasets by American researchers; it is only in 
recent years that re-identification attacks been attempted by 
researchers elsewhere in the world.
 Another finding is that the number of datasets can be used as an 
attribute.
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1.0 Introduction 
Where traditionally marketeers south insight into customers and their 
preferences by using techniques such as; psychographic variables (Abduljalil 
& Hon, 2011) and; market segmentation (Yankelovich & Meer, 2006), with 
advances in technology and the advent of ever-larger collections of data, big 
data has changed all that. 
Big data is a term used to describe the analysis and storage of very large 
amounts of complex data, defined by Gartner as; “high-volume, -velocity and 
-variety information assets” (Sicular, 2013) that, when processed, can be used
to; “enable enhanced decision-making, insight discovery and process 
optimization” (ICO, 2012). 
Data is the lifeblood of most organisations and it is estimated that up to 80% 
of all data held in organisations, can now be classed as big data (Khan, et al., 
2014). Organisations and people produce and use data in many ways to 
further their businesses or interest. With the use of the Internet and the 
exponential growth in data being published in the public domain, in excess of 
2 billion people worldwide are now connected to the Internet. 
The rate of data generated is expected to rise by 40 zettabytes (ZB) by 2020 
and continue to rise at a rate of 50-60% annually beyond that (Khan, et al., 
2014). As a result, organisations and individuals now have access to a much 
wider and varied corpus of data than ever before, this has been termed the 
‘era of big data’ (Berner, Graupner, & Maedche, 2014; Rotella, 2012).
When data is published in the public domain, the information may be 
published by private organisations (e.g. Netflix and AOL, (Ohm, 2010)), or, it 
may be released by individuals themselves through for example, social media 
sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter or similar social networking 
platforms.
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This means that data mining big data has revolutionised how companies find 
out about individuals, and their preferences. Marketeers have realised that 
mining big data has the potential to provide them with valuable insight into 
customer preferences and behaviours in ways not previously possible (e.g. 
see (Duhigg, 2012)). 
This is not just true of private companies; public organisations are also 
realising the value of big data. They however, have entered the big data arena
from the perspective of economies of scale and data sharing, seeking to “use 
technology to join up and share services rather than duplicate them” (The 
Cabinet Office, 2005, p. 1). 
To this end government agencies have, for the last decade or so, been 
working on a variety of big data projects designed to integrate back office 
systems with front office services initially through the e-government agenda, 
then through the transforming government agenda (Patterson, Bennett, & 
Waine, 2008) and more recently through the seizing the data opportunity 
strategy (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2013). 
However, these government initiatives have not stopped at local level, 
integrating services within individual government departments or even 
government agencies, many of the projects have been more ambitious 
seeking to create national datasets and indeed, creating open source access 
to government datasets. 
This trend has been brought about by the Re-use of Public Sector Information
Regulations 2005 and, more recently, 2015 (ROPSIR), implementing EU 
Directives 2003/98/EC and 2013/37/EU. ROPSIR places an obligation on 
public bodies to make data available for re-use and to, where possible, 
release such data in electronic format where possible (ROPSIR 2015, s. 11). 
Thus, public bodies now regularly contribute to data publishing, releasing 
increasing amounts of information and datasets open source (Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills, 2013; Simpson, 2011). 
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In the UK more than 20,000 datasets have been made available through the 
data.gov.uk site since 2010 (Data.gov.uk, 2016), and in the United States 
(US), in excess of one million datasets have so far been made available 
through open source portals (Gkoulalas-Divanis & Aonghusa, 2014). 
From a corporate perspective, organisations use big data to try to gain 
commercial advantage. For example, organisations use big data analytics 
(data mining) to discover more about their customers and identify trends
(Goodman, 2015). From an individual perspective this raises questions about 
how much insight can be gleaned into our lives and indeed, our current 
situation or whereabouts which in turn, raises serious concerns over the 
privacy and security of personal information (Ohm, 2010).
Some protection does exist. For example, the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA)
requires that any personally identifiable information may only be released with
express permission of the individual. Further, the 2013 EU directive on the re-
use of public sector information does state that individuals right to privacy, 
which is protected under Directive 95/46/EC, should be preserved prior to the 
release of any public data (2013/37/EU, Para. 11). Thus, before release these 
datasets will have been anonymised to prevent companies or individuals from 
identifying any of the individuals the data might relate to ((2013/37/EU, Para. 
21). 
There are a number of anonymisation techniques in use (Fung, Ke, Rui, & Yu,
2010; Lan, Yilei, & Yingjie, 2012) that can be used to de-identify data. How the
anonymisation is done depends on the country of origin. For example, in the 
US open source published dataset in the health sector must be de-identified 
in accordance with the anonymisation rules laid out in the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, better known as the 
“Safe harbor” standards, prior to public release (Health Information Privacy 
(HIP), 2014). 
In the United Kingdom, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has 
issued a code of practice on anonymisation (ICO, 2012) which provides 
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guidelines on data de-identification and pseudonymisation in order to limit the 
risk of re-identification taking place. 
However, these methods are not completely risk free and re-identification is a 
real risk around the world (El Emam, Jonker, Arbuckle, & Malin, 2011; 
MacRae, Dobbie, & Ranchhod, 2012; Ohm, 2010), particularly where data 
miners use multiple datasets to retrieve personal information from the data.
Most recently, this caused the Health and Social Care Information Centre 
(HSCIC) to halt the release of UK anonymised health data (part of the 
care.data project) for six months amid fears over data privacy and security
(Kirby, 2014; Walker, Meikle, & Ramesh, 2014). 
This paper seeks to look into this problem by conducting a systematic 
literature review (SLR) of research that provides information and details of 
successful data re-identification cases. More particularly, the paper will also 
explore whether re-identification attempts are more successful where one or 
more of the datasets mined include geographical (GIS) or spatial data.
El Emam et al. conducted a SLR in 2011, which sought to identify successful 
cases of de-identification in the Health Sector (El Emam, Jonker, et al., 2011). 
They found 14 cases where successful re-identification had taken place, 10 of
which involved US datasets.  Since then research into re-identification has 
been successful in New Zealand (MacRae, et al., 2012) the UK and Canada
(El Emam, Buckeridge, et al., 2011) to name but a few.
Furthermore, with the advances in data mining and so much more data being 
made available on a daily basis (McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2012), an updated 
review would be appropriate. 
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the research
questions and review methodology; Section 3 presents the findings of the 
review; Section 4 discusses the findings and describes open issues, 
challenges and opportunities for further research; Section 5 provides an 
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overview of limitations; and Section 6 concludes the article. Appendix A 
contains definitions of terminology, whilst Appendix B contains a full list of 
papers included in the review. 
2.0 Materials and Methods
The review has been conducted following the protocol of Beecham, Baddoo, 
Hall, Robinson, and Sharp (2008), and the methodology and guidelines of 
Kitchenham, (Kitchenham, 2004; Kitchenham & Charters, 2007).
2.1 Research Questions
The research questions addressed by the review were limited to four 
questions that asked firstly how many instances of re-identification 
have proved successful? Of those, how many datasets were mined to 
conduct the re-identification tests? Where did the datasets originate? 
Finally, did any of the datasets mined include geographical (mapping) 
data?
However, the findings, as will be shown, lent themselves to much 
deeper analysis, and therefore, the resulting research questions this 
article will address are as follows:
RQ1: How many successful re-identification attempts have been 
carried out; which country did the paper originate in and where was it 
published?
RQ2: What types and how many datasets were mined in the 
successful re-identification attempts?
RQ3: How many and what types attributes were used to conduct the 
re-identification?
RQ4: Did any of the datasets include mapping (GIS) data?
Re-Identification Attacks – A Systematic Literature Review
2.2 Data Sources
The papers selected for inclusion in the review were selected from a 
database search of seven electronic databases. The databases were 
chosen based on a combination of a sample search of databases that 
held details of strategic literature reviews conducted in the software 
engineering field, and the recommended databases of Brereton, 
Kitchenham, Budgen, Turner, and Khalil (2007) and Kitchenham and 
Charters (2007). Table 1 lists the seven electronic databases that were 
searched for relevant papers in this review.
Table 1
Databases Searched
IEEExplore
ACM Digital Library
Google Scholar
Citeseer library
ScienceDirect
SpringerLink
Wiley InterScience
2.3 The Search Process
The papers for inclusion were selected through a process of three 
phases. Phase one, Identification: the titles and abstracts were read 
to select suitable papers for inclusion. Phase two, Screening: 
abstracts and conclusions were read and scored in accordance with 
relevance. Phase three, Eligibility: a full review of papers from phase 
two, including a review of the citations of the selected papers. The 
inclusion/exclusion decision was made based on the assessment 
criteria laid out in Table 2. 
Table 2 – Phase 3 Quality Assessments 
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Item Assessment Criteria Score
(0-1)
Score Response 
options
1 Has re-identification attempt 
been conducted
1 = Yes
0 = No
2 Has re-identification attempt 
been successful
1 = Yes
0 = No
3 Is study peer reviewed 1 = Yes
0 = No
4 Did any of the datasets 
include GIS/spatial data
0.5 = Yes
0 = No
Total Quality Score
(Adapted from Beecham et al. 2008, p. 9-10) 
Papers where re-identification had proved successful were included in the 
review.
2.4 Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria
The review targeted papers where re-identification had proved 
successful. Only papers written in English were targeted. The key 
search terms used are listed in Table 3.
Table 3 
Search Terms Used
Anonymisation Deanonymisation
Identification Re-identification
Pseudonymisation Privacy
Spatial GIS
To keep focus on answering the research questions, Table 4 lists the 
subtopics that were excluded in the search criteria. 
Table 4 
Search Terms Excluded
Genomics (DNA) and fingerprint data Vehicle data
Graphics video surveillance
Location Privacy unless the location 
data had been utilised as part of a data 
Images and Image processing 
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linking re-identification attempt and 
combined with one or more relational 
datasets
2.5 Data Collection
At each phase, data was extracted Table 5 shows the data extracted 
from each study during phases two and three.
Table 5
Phase 2 – Data Extracted Phase 3 – Data Extracted
Data source and type of 
publication
Data set origin
Paper title Data set size
Abstract Number of datasets mined
Conclusion Types of dataset mined
Publication year Re-identification strategy used
Author(s) Number of attributes used 
Country of study Types of attributes used 
Full citation
Number of times cited
3.0 Results
In total 10,873 database entries were searched during phase one, from which 
220 papers were selected for inclusion in phase two. From this 50 papers 
were selected for inclusion in phase three, with an additional 33 further papers
reviewed from the citations of the selected papers. By the end of phase three, 
the final number of papers included in the review was 55. A full list of the 
papers included in the review can be found in Appendix B.
3.1 Research Questions
RQ1: How many successful re-identification attempts have been 
carried out; which country did the paper originate in and where was it 
published?
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There were 55 instances of successful re-identification attempts. In the 
majority of cases, the research had been conducted by American 
researchers (56%). Only 3.6% of the papers originated from UK 
research teams. The highest percentage of papers were published in 
Conference papers or Workshops (61%), whilst only 8 of the papers 
have been published in Academic Journals.
RQ2: What types and how many datasets were mined in the 
successful re-identification attempts?
The search engine (e.g. Google, yahoo) was the most popular type of 
dataset used in the re-identification process at 43.6%, followed closely 
by social network data (32.7%). The data types used were 
predominantly relational data (54.4%). However, in recent years the 
use of dynamic data has increased to become the most popular data 
type with 16 out of 29 papers published between 2011 and 2014 using 
dynamic data. This corresponds with the increase in Internet and social
network usage in recent years (Khan, et al., 2014; Smith, Szongott, 
Henne, & von Voigt, 2012). 
What was noteworthy was that, whilst the majority of the researchers 
were American, only 32.7% of the datasets used were US based. 
Looking at where the datasets originated, it was found that over half of 
the attacks were conducted on global datasets such as social 
networking sites and/or search engines. 
Table 6
Year Published * No of Datasets used Crosstabulation
Count  
No of Datasets used
Total1 2 3 4 5 6 8 16
Year Published pre-2000 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
2001 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
2002 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2003 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2005 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
2006 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
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2007 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
2008 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
2009 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 6
2010 1 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 5
2011 2 5 2 0 1 1 0 0 11
2012 2 6 2 0 0 1 0 0 11
2013 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 6
2014 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 19 19 10 2 1 2 1 1 55
The number of datasets mined ranged from 1 – 16, with one or two 
datasets proving the most popular at 34.5% respectively. Looking at 
this over time, it was also evident that more papers have been 
published in recent years with 40 of the papers published since 2009 
(Table 6).
RQ3: How many and what types of attributes were used to conduct the
re-identification?
The number of attributes used to re-identify were two or three (70.9%). 
This corresponds with early research which showed that 2 attributes (1 
key attribute and 1 identifier) are required for successful re-
identification (Latanya Sweeney, 1997), or where no identifier is 
available, three key-attributes are required to uniquely identify (L. 
Sweeney, 2000).
The most common attributes used to aid in the re-identification were 
key-attributes then sensitive attributes and finally, identifying attributes. 
This result is to be expected where data has been anonymised and 
direct identifiers removed or obfuscated.
Another interesting finding was that when comparing the number of 
attributes used with the number of datasets mined, that the number of 
datasets used can be used as an attribute. Whilst, research has proved
that multiple attributes are necessary for successful re-identification
(Latanya Sweeney, 1997; L. Sweeney, 2000), it was found that in 
papers that had utilised only one attribute or one dataset to re-identify, 
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this was combined with multiple attributes or datasets respectively in 
order for the re-identification attack to be successful. 
RQ4: Did any of the datasets include mapping (GIS) data?
There were only 3 of the 55 papers included in the review that solely 
utilised GIS data to re-identify. However, 34.6% of all the attacks used 
location and/or GIS data as part of the re-identification process.
3.2 Other Findings
During phase three, it became apparent that there were different types 
of re-identification attack depending on the types of data worked with 
and the research and re-identification strategy used. A decision was 
therefore made to categorise the results into five types of attack. These
are described briefly in Table 7.
Table 7
Type of Attack Classification
Aggregation of 
information attack
Using multiple datasets to achieve re-
identification by data linking across datasets 
looking for data overlaps (Clark, 2012; 
Ochoa, Rasmussen, Robson, & Salib, 2001; 
Latanya Sweeney, 2011)
Inference/Other attack Where inference or prior knowledge has 
been used to re-identify (linkage attacks)
(Fung, et al., 2010). This category also 
covers attacks that do not fit into any of the 
other categories
Anonymisation 
Reversed attack
An attack that involves using background 
knowledge of the anonymisation method 
and/or algorithm(s) used. (Abou-el-ela 
Abdou, Nermin, & Hesham, 2013) or where 
statistical means have been used to re-
identify (Benitez & Malin, 2010; Koot, van’t 
Noordende, & de Laat, 2010; L. Sweeney, 
2000)
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Graph/Node attack Using nodes, labels and/or topology to re-
identify (Sharma, Gupta, & Bhatnagar, 2012)
GIS/location attack Re-identification using spatial, GIS and/or 
graph data (Cassa, Wieland, & Mandl, 2008)
Following on from this categorisation, a more in-depth analysis of the 
data collected was conducted. The findings from each of these 
categories are outlines in sections 4.3 – 4.7.
3.3 Aggregation of Information Attack
This formed the largest group of attacks with 20 of the 55 papers falling
into this category. Furthermore, of those 70% were papers published 
since 2011. 
Whilst this group of attacks consisted of attacks using multiple 
datasets, in over half the attacks, at least one of the datasets used for 
the attack included either social network and/or a search engine 
followed closely by public datasets (used in 9 of the 20 papers). 
What is interesting is that whist public datasets were chosen as a 
dataset of choice in the early work (Ochoa, et al., 2001; Latanya 
Sweeney, 1997), there appeared to be a dip in popularity of using 
public data between 2002 and 2010 with no papers in this category 
utilising public data (see Table 8). Then, in 2011, public data once 
again became a dataset of choice for re-identification attempts.
Table 8
Publicationyear*$Data_Sets*AttackCategoryAggregationofinfo1OtherInference2An Crosstabulation
Attack Category
Data Sets Useda
Tota
lEmail Government Electricity
Ratings
_Tags
Searh_
Engine
Social_
Networ
k
Refer
ence Other
Aggr
egati
on of
Pu
blic
ati
pre-
200
6
Count 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
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info on 
ye
ar
200
9
Count 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 2
201
0
Count 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2
2011 Count 0 5 1 0 2 2 2 3 7
201
2
Count 0 1 0 1 3 4 2 0 5
201
3
Count 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 2
Total Count 1 9 1 1 11 12 5 4 20
Percentages and totals are based on respondents.
a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.
Another finding in this category of attack was that in 58.8% of attacks, 
the attackers had used identifiers as one of the attributes and this had 
been combined with a key attribute in 87.5% of attacks. This finding is 
somewhat surprising given that identifiers should, in theory, have been 
removed as part of the anonymisation process prior to the data being 
released. 
However, bearing in mind that social networking data has been utilised 
as one of the datasets of choice in 12 of the 20 papers in this category, 
individuals’ names and/or usernames will have been more widely 
available and therefore an obvious target for use as an attribute in any 
re-identification attempt.
3.4 Inference/Other Attack
This category covers attacks where the attacker has used existing 
knowledge to aid the attack. It also covers other types of attack that did
not fall into any of the other categories. No particular patterns were 
found in this category, perhaps due to the variety of re-identification 
techniques used.
There were 8 papers in this category ranging from re-identification by 
analysing writing styles (Almishari & Tsudik, 2012), to using machine 
learning such as weka software (Hall, et al., 2009) in combination with 
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inference to re-identify users (Sramka, 2010; Sramka, Safavi-Naini, & 
Denzinger, 2009). 
The most interesting paper in the category however, was a paper 
detailing how, by analysing electricity meter readings over time, 
researchers were able to identify patterns and thus, re-identify the 
household (Buchmann, Bohm, Burghardt, & Kessler, 2013).
3.5 Anonymisation Reversed Attack
The anonymisation reversed category consists of 11 papers where 
researchers had reversed the anonymisation applied to the original 
data. The predominant dataset mined in the category were public 
datasets (54%). In fact it was not until 2006 that researchers attempted
to reverse anonymisation on a non-public dataset, when two 
researchers showed that it was possible to positively re-identify from a 
non-public dataset when they re-identified users from published 
anonymised movie ratings (Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2006). 
This case involved the Netflix movie ratings that had been released as 
part of the Kaggle data mining challenge. 
It is conceivable that the reason for this timelap before non-public 
datasets were used for re-identification were that, prior to 2006, the use
of Social Networks and search engines had not yet become 
commonplace. Whilst social networks have been around since the late 
1990s, it was not until 2006, when MySpace, Facebook and Twitter 
started to become popular, that social networking really took off. 
Facebook now have an estimated 500 million users (BRASS Program 
Planning Committee, 2011).
However, the Netflix case was the first to prove that the scope of re-
identification reached beyond public datasets, meaning an attack was 
possible on any released datasets.
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3.6 Graph/Node Attack
The graph/node attack category proved to contain the second largest 
corpus of papers with 23.6% of the papers in the review.
This group of attacks contains papers where researchers have 
primarily used dynamic data such as social networking or search 
engine data graphs to conduct the re-identification attacks. The attacks 
were conducted by linking graphs in order to re-identify (Gayo Avello, 
2011; Peng, Li, Zou, & Wu, 2012). Early papers in this category utilised 
the Enron email database that was released as part of the Enron 
bankruptcy proceedings by the US Federal Energy Regulator in 2001
(Hay, Miklau, Jensen, Weis, & Srivastava, 2007; McCallum, Corrada-
Emmanuel, & Wang, 2005; Shetty & Adibi, 2005). It can therefore be 
surmised that the Enron email database was the dataset upon which 
early graph-linking theory was based.
3.7 GIS/location Attack
The last group of attacks is also the smallest with only 3 papers falling 
into this category. For that reason, no noticeable trends were found.
All three papers had used geographical location tags as one of the 
attributes and combined this with other data such as tweets or 
timestamps in the re-identification attempts (Friedland, Maier, Sommer,
& Weaver, 2011; Goga, et al., 2013; Jedrzejczyk, Price, Bandara, & 
Nuseibeh, 2009). Therefore, arguably these papers could equally have 
been placed in the data aggregation category. 
4.0 Discussion
The earliest successful re-identification attempt was published in the late 
1990’s, when Latanya Sweeney (1997) matched the Cambridge, 
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Massachusetts voters roll to medical records to re-identify. After this, numbers 
of published attacks rose slowly up until the mid-2000 when this type of 
research or attack started to gain momentum. However, in more recent years, 
numbers of attacks have risen considerably with thirty of the successful 
attacks found having been published since 2011. Thus, it can be surmised 
that as research in this area is becoming established there may be many 
more instances of re-identification reported.
Looking at the trends for using public datasets for re-identification attacks, 
public data was used in early years and then not utilised for nearly a decade 
(2002 - 2010). This may be explained by looking at the history of 
anonymisation and the release of pubic data. Sweeney was the first 
researcher to identify the link between publically released data and the ability 
to re-identify. This led to the development of the k-anonymisation algorithm
(Samarati & Sweeney, 1998), now accepted as the minimum anonymisation 
standard for data publishing (Abou-el-ela Abdou, et al., 2013). This enabled 
organisations and public bodies to anonymise data prior to release, which 
could explain the lack of successful re-identification attempts on public data 
during the middle year group. However, with the increasing number of public 
dataset being released open source in recent years (Department for Business
Innovation and Skills, 2013), more public data has become accessible and 
thus, public datasets have once again become a dataset of choice for re-
identification attempts. 
What was interesting was that, in view of the UK government data publishing 
policy (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2013), it should follow 
that the UK would have more research into this area. Yet, only 2 of the papers
found had been written by UK researchers, one of which used a combination 
of location (geographic) data and dynamic data. In this paper, the research 
team uncovered both identifiers (names and addresses) and key identifiers 
(age, occupation and email) by studying users movements and linking these 
to publically available data from social networks and search engines to 
successfully re-identify (Jedrzejczyk, et al., 2009)
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The second paper was less specific in its findings. However, what was 
uncovered was interesting, in that the researchers only searched public data 
that has been available open source. A team of MBA students from Oxford 
were given an assignment to consider the security and privacy implications of 
public datasets being made available open source through sites such as 
data.gov.uk. What was discovered ranged from being able to ascertain staff 
movement within public buildings based on the energy consumption of the 
buildings through to being able to successfully re-identify Senior Military 
Personnel and ascertain their salaries (Simpson, 2011). While this was a 
small study for a particular assignment, it does beg the question; how much 
more insight could be gained if an attacker was to mine the data in more 
depth?
Looking at where research originated more generally, it was found that the 
majority of re-identification attacks originated in the Americas with US and 
Canada conducting 67.2% of all research found. The remaining body of 
research was widely spread out in origin; 16.4% originating in Europe, 9% in 
Asia and 7.3% of research was collaborations between multiple nations. 
Furthermore, most of the research conducted outside the Americas, has been 
carried out in the last 5 years (66.6%). This would indicate that, whilst 
researchers in the Americas have been looking at this area for quite some 
time, it is only recently that researchers in the rest of the world have started to
take more of an interest. 
5.0 Limitations
The searches were carried out and scored following the methodology of
Kitchenham and Charters (2007) with the primary researcher conducting 
phases one and two. To guard against potential bias, the selection criteria and
quality checks were developed by, and agreed between, the authors. In 
addition, the protocol defined that for phase two of the review an independent 
researcher would check and verify the selection. However, due to mitigating 
circumstances of the independent researcher and time constraints, this did 
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not happen. Rather the primary author conducted all three phases alone , 
overseen by the second author.
The number of additional papers selected from the citations during phase 
three appeared rather high and therefore, this was investigated further to 
ensure the methodology had been followed correctly. What transpired was 
that, whilst 33 additional papers were selected for inclusion, 42% of those did 
not pass the relevancy test to be included in the final review. It was concluded
that a combination of deepening of subject knowledge and the primary 
researcher perhaps being overcautious in selecting papers from the citation to
make up for the lack of a second reviewer would account for this apparent 
discrepancy.
6.0 Conclusion
This review has shown how the number of successful re-identification 
attempts on publically available datasets has risen sharply, particularly in 
recent years with 72.7% of all papers found having been published since 
2009. The review has also shown that whilst the Americas have been 
conducting research in this area for over 2 decades, it is only in recent years 
that the rest of the world have started to take note and produce papers on re-
identification attacks.  This would indicate that this area of research is 
growing.
With the many methods and strategies already used in the re-identification 
process, it is likely that as researchers become more adept at re-identification,
more and more successful attacks will occur. Already there are many 
organisations who make their living from selling data analytic results or indeed
helping companies analyse their own big data (e.g. SAS Institute Inc., 2015). 
If these trends are allowed to continue without intervention, no dataset, 
whether anonymised or not, will be safe from the threat of re-identification. 
Thus, much scope exists in this field of study to, not only develop more robust
anonymisation techniques, but also put in place better safeguards around 
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publishing any information pertaining to individuals. Furthermore, to fully 
understand the depth and breadth of this problem, opportunities exist for not 
only exploring and mining the large corpus of public data available, but also to
review the security, privacy and policy implications that re-identification 
attacks bring. It may even require a completely fresh approach to data 
publishing, to minimise the risk of privacy breaches occurring in the first place.
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Appendix A - Definitions 
Data  
Data may be classed as structured, meaning it can be stored and managed in
an organised database, this type of data can also be referred to as relational 
data (Baxendale & Codd, 1970). Relational data consists mainly of text and 
numbers (Connolly & Begg, 2005).  
Unstructured data on the other hand, consists of large quantities of 
unorganised data that may contain not just textual information, but also many 
other types of data. Examples of unstructured data include; social networking 
data, IP addresses, images and text messages. Unstructured data may 
change rapidly and for that reason, is sometimes referred to as dynamic data. 
Dynamic data may be stored and managed in both relational tables and in 
graph format.   
Graphs are arranged into nodes and edges. For instance, in a social 
networking dataset, the nodes may depict the users and the edges represent 
their interactions. Thus, for example, graph data may be used to express 
relationships between users (Sharma, Gupta, & Bhatnagar, 2012).  
Attributes  
The information contained within all datasets consists of different types of 
data, also known as attributes. Attributes can be classified into:  
Identifiers; i.e. any data that may directly identify an individual e.g. 
name or national insurance number;  
Key identifiers (also called quasi-identifiers); i.e. any data from which 
identifiable information may be inferred e.g. when data is linked 
(Thomson, Bzdel, Golden-Biddle, Reay, & Estabrooks, 2005).  
Sensitive attributes; i.e. individual specific information that may assist
in re-identification such as salary, ailment or disability status;  
Non-sensitive attributes; i.e. any other information within the dataset; 
and 
Graph attributes; i.e. the nodes, edges and labels of a graph.  
Anonymisation  
Anonymisation is the process of masking or removing any identifiable 
information from within a dataset (Thomson, et al., 2005). There are many 
ways data can be anonymised depending on the data type.  
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For traditional relational data (i.e. data held in organised tables and 
databases) the most widely used method of anonymisation is k-anonymisation
(Samarati & Sweeney, 1998) whereby any identifying data is suppressed or 
generalised.   
For unstructured data, k-anonymisation alone is not effective and therefore, 
other anonymisation methods are used to obscure identifiable information. 
These methods include clustering and graph modification (Sharma, et al., 
2012).  
Re-Identification  
Re-identification occurs when anonymisation is reversed or de-anonymised, 
bringing the identifying information to light. Re-identification may be achieved 
in a number of ways including linking datasets, using prior or background 
knowledge (Abou-el-ela Abdou, Nermin, & Hesham, 2013) or by comparing 
longitudinal data to find patterns (Tudor, Almgren, & Papatriantafilou, 2013). 
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Appendix B - Full list of papers included in the Review 
Title of paper 
Publication 
year 
@ i seek'fb. me': identifying users across multiple online social 
networks (Jain, Kumaraguru, & Joshi, 2013) 2013 
A face is exposed for AOL searcher no. 4417749 (Barbaro & Zeller, 
2006) 2006 
A machine learning based approach for predicting undisclosed 
attributes in social networks (Kótyuk & Buttyán, 2012) 2012 
A Practical Attack to De-Anonymize Social Network Users 
(Wondracek, Holz, Kirda, & Kruegel, 2010) 2010 
A privacy attack that removes the majority of the noise from 
perturbed data. (Sramka, 2010) 2010 
A practical approach to achieve private medical record linkage in 
light of public resources (Kuzu, Kantarcioglu, Durham, Toth, & Malin, 
2013) 2012 
A study on the re-identifiability of Dutch citizens (Koot, van’t 
Noordende, & de Laat, 2010) 2010 
Abusing social networks for automated user profiling (Balduzzi, et al.,
2010) 2010 
All liaisons are dangerous when all your friends are known to us 
(Gayo Avello, 2011) 2011 
An Attack on the Privacy of Sanitized Data that Fuses the Outputs of 
Multiple Data Miners (Sramka, Safavi-Naini, & Denzinger, 2009) 2009 
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Anonymizing social networks (Hay, Miklau, Jensen, Weis, & 
Srivastava, 2007) 2007 
Betrayed by my shadow: learning data identity via trail matching 
(Malin, 2005) 2005 
Correlating a Persona to a Person (Clark, 2012) 2012 
De-Anonymizing Dynamic Social Networks (Xuan, Lan, Zhiguo, & 
Ming, 2011) 2011 
De-anonymizing social networks (Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2009) 2009 
Deanonymizing mobility traces: using social network as a side-
channel (Srivatsa & Hicks, 2012) 2012 
Discovering important nodes through graph entropy the case of 
enron email database (Shetty & Adibi, 2005) 2005 
Exploiting Innocuous Activity for Correlating Users Across Sites 
(Goga, et al., 2013) 2013 
Exploring Linkability of User Reviews (Almishari & Tsudik, 2012) 2012 
Exploring re-identification risks in public domains (Ramachandran, 
Singh, Porter, & Nagle, 2012)   2012 
GlobalInferencer: Linking Personal Social Content with Data on the 
Web (Paradesi & Shih, 2011) 2011 
I Know What You Did Last Summer: risks of location data leakage in 
mobile and social computing (Jedrzejczyk, Price, Bandara, & 
Nuseibeh, 2009) 2009 
Identifying Users Across Social Tagging Systems (Iofciu, 
Fankhauser, Abel, & Bischoff, 2011) 2011 
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Ineluctable background checking on social networks: Linking job 
seeker's résumé and posts (Okuno, Ichino, Echizen, Utsumi, & 
Yoshiura, 2013) 2013 
Involuntary information leakage in social network services (Lam, 
Chen, & Chen, 2008) 2008 
Is privacy still an issue in the era of big data? — Location disclosure 
in spatial footprints (L. Li & Goodchild, 2013) 2013 
k-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy (Latanya Sweeney, 
2002) 2002 
Large Online Social Footprints--An Emerging Threat (Irani, Webb, Li,
& Pu, 2009) 2009 
Link prediction by de-anonymization: How We Won the Kaggle 
Social Network Challenge (Narayanan, Shi, & Rubinstein, 2011) 2011 
Messin’with texas deriving mother’s maiden names using public 
records (Griffith & Jakobsson, 2005) 2006 
New threats to health data privacy (F. Li, Zou, Liu, & Chen, 2011) 2011 
On Privacy and Public Data: A study of data.gov.uk (Simpson, 2011) 2011 
On the anonymizability of graphs (C. Aggarwal, Li, & Yu, 2014) 2014 
On the Hardness of Graph Anonymization (C. C. Aggarwal, Li, & Yu, 
2011) 2011 
Patient Identifiability in Pharmaceutical Marketing Data (Latanya 
Sweeney, 2011) 2011 
Predicting Social Security numbers from public data (Acquisti & 
Gross, 2009) 2009 
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Preserving Privacy in Social Networks Against Neighborhood Attacks
(Bin & Jian, 2008) 2008 
Privacy preservation in social graphs (Zhang, Xu, Bylander, Ruan, & 
Krishnan, 2012) 2012 
Provable De-anonymization of Large Datasets with Sparse 
Dimensions (Datta, Sharma, & Sinha, 2012) 2012 
Re-identification of Smart Meter data (Buchmann, Bohm, Burghardt, 
& Kessler, 2013) 2013 
Reconstructing Profiles from Information Disseminated on the 
Internet (Aimeur, Brassard, & Molins, 2012) 2012 
Reidentification of Individuals in Chicago's Homicide Database: A 
Technical and Legal Study (Ochoa, Rasmussen, Robson, & Salib, 
2001) 2001 
Revisiting the uniqueness of simple demographics in the US 
population (Golle, 2006) 2006 
Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets (Narayanan & 
Shmatikov, 2008) 2008 
Seed and Grow An attack against anonymized social networks 
(Peng, Li, Zou, & Wu, 2014) 2012 
Sherlock Holmes ’ Evil Twin: On The Impact of Global Inference for 
Online Privacy (Friedland, Maier, Sommer, & Weaver, 2011) 2011 
Stalking online: on user privacy in social networks (Yang, Lutes, Li, 
Luo, & Liu, 2012) 2012 
Structural Attack to Anonymous Graph of Social Networks 2013 
The re-identification risk of Canadians from longitudinal 2011 
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demographics (El Emam, et al., 2011) 
The ultimate invasion of privacy: Identity theft 2011 
To join or not to join: the illusion of privacy in social networks with 
mixed public and private user profiles (Zheleva & Getoor, 2009) 2009 
Trail reidentification learning who you are from where you have been 
(Malin, Sweeney, & Newton, 2003) 2003 
Uniqueness of Simple Demographics in the U.S. Population (L. 
Sweeney, 2000) 2000 
Weaving technology and policy together to maintain confidentiality 
(Latanya Sweeney, 1997) 1997 
You are what you say: privacy risks of public mentions (Frankowski, 
Cosley, Sen, Terveen, & Riedl, 2006) 2006 
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